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A DERIVATIVES MARKET IN 
LEGAL ACADEMIA 
Paul H. Edelman† 
ABSTRACT: Building on the success of derivatives markets 
in the financial arena, I show how similar markets can be 
used to hedge risk in legal academia. Prudent use of these 
markets will generate cash, mitigate errors in hiring, and 
increase the academic prestige of law schools. In short, they 
can do for legal academia what they have already done to 
the financial world. 
N TUMULTUOUS ECONOMIC TIMES there is considerable comfort 
in being ensconced in legal academia. Unemployment does not 
lie in wait for those of us fortunate enough to be tenured. To 
be sure some of the perquisites of the profession – free meals, 
a nice travel budget, maybe a laptop or two – may be pruned, but 
those are small quibbles in the face of lay-offs at major firms or 3Ls 
who seek permanent jobs while servicing a large debt. We really 
have little about which to complain. 
One area where shrunken endowments do manifest themselves 
meaningfully, though, is in the inability to hire. In these times the 
errors of past recruitments come to the fore. Hiring is a risky en-
deavor. The Brilliant Supreme Court clerk (BSC) who seemed a 
sure thing decides to spend his time marketing haiku on the inter-
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net. The fellow from Harvard with the stellar recommendations 
develops writer’s block and is unable to finish a manuscript. Or the 
former associate at Cravath decides to pursue a second career in 
mathematics and spends all of her time teaching calculus. Mistakes 
happen. Are law schools destined to absorb these mistakes? Perhaps 
there is a way to hedge this risk? 
This short essay outlines just such a way to hedge errors in legal 
academia. Borrowing from the notorious success of such financial 
leaders as Lehman Brothers and AIG, I propose a derivatives market 
for legal academia. By bundling the various academic assets from 
the faculty, and tranching them appropriately, a law school will be 
able to hedge its errors in hiring, reinvigorate its own scholarly pro-
file, and perhaps even supplement its revenue. The risk can be man-
aged and all will benefit.1 
Consider the problem of High-theory Law School (HLS). It is 
about to hire the BSC, but there is uncertainty as to whether he will 
write anything that might burnish the HLS brand. On the other side 
is Our Little Sisters of the Poor Law School (OLSPLS), which de-
sires to advance its scholarly profile but is unable to hire any candi-
dates who are likely to do so. Suppose that HLS bought a put from 
OLSPLS for the writing of the BSC. If the papers that the BSC 
writes are not very good, HLS can ship them off with any citation 
counts, page counts, etc., now credited to OLSPLS. OLSPLS 
makes some money on the front end and, even if the put is exer-
cised, gets credited for some scholarship that it would not likely get 
any other way. HLS is protected from low quality work for a small 
price. The downside risk to HLS of hiring the BSC is hedged, and 
OLSPLS potentially gets some exposure that it would never see 
otherwise. 
Call options might be of use in this situation, too. Suppose the 
BSC’s production is voluminous but the marginal benefit to HLS of 
his twelfth article in a year is small. It might be more efficient for 
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HLS to sell a call on the BSC’s work to OLSPLS. HLS makes some 
money on the transaction and can avoid the dilution of its brand as 
long as the article produced by the BCS exceeds the less than strin-
gent standards of OLSPLS. On the other hand, OLSPLS can guaran-
tee an improvement of its scholarly profile without the significant 
expense of maintaining the BSC.  
There may well be other parties interested in these futures. Law 
reviews might be interested in buying calls on certain faculty. In-
deed, some law reviews might even be interested in buying puts, so 
they can unload an article by a home faculty member that is not 
worth publishing. The possibilities are limitless. 
Having seen the opportunities available there is no turning back. 
Consider HLS once again. Given its eminence, it hardly needs any 
of its faculty to publish. Scholarship could be turned into a revenue 
stream. HLS could bundle its faculty’s work and sell off the whole 
stream of articles to other law schools or law reviews. Of course 
even the fine scholarship from HLS has some variations, so we 
might want to tranch the offering into different qualities. That is, 
sell off the top 10% of the articles for one price, the next 10% at 
another, and so forth. To do this we would need an independent 
auditor of academic quality. Surely once the market niche is avail-
able someone will come and fill it. U.S News has demonstrated acu-
men in assessing legal quality. The AALS is also well-positioned to 
play this role. I am sure that the two together would provide the 
same reliable ratings that we have come to expect from Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s in the financial context. 
But what would happen if HLS somehow defaulted on its pro-
duction of papers? Law reviews, waiting for their papers to arrive, 
would have nothing to publish. The whole academic endeavor 
might creak to a halt. How can we protect against this (incredibly 
unlikely) scenario? Once again we can turn to the financial markets 
for inspiration. Some law school might insure the appearance of 
scholarship by offering legal academe default swaps. In the unlikely 
case that HLS should fail to produce an adequate supply, the profes-
sors at Crank-it-out Law School (CLS) will, for a fee, guarantee to 
provide substitute articles. If CLS were to insure too many aca-
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demic streams, and if they were to all default, there might be a 
problem. No article can be published in more than one law review 
(at least not without changing the title and abstract, and those are 
often the most difficult things to do well), and CLS might not be 
able to fully meet the contract. But surely this scenario is unlikely, 
and we can count on the ethical behavior of the leadership at CLS to 
avoid this moral hazard.2 
A different approach to hedging risk might be to allow options 
on the faculty themselves. That is, if OLSPLS were to sell a put on 
the BSC, then HLS would have the option of actually sending him 
away if his work were below standard. It would be far cheaper than 
denying tenure.3 There are obvious contractual issues that arise4 
should we take the market to this level. But if endowments were to 
drop a little more . . . . 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                
2 But cf. AIG. 
3 I imagine that the put market would spike after faculty meetings, as well. 
4 And possibly constitutional ones, as well. See the 13th amendment. 
